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REIMAGINING THE RIGHT TO COMMERCIAL




Does the right to engage in private, adult, consensual sexual
conduct without intervention of the government declared in Law-
rence v. Texas1 include the right to buy and sell sex?
The short-term answer is probably no, thanks in part to the
caveat paragraph of dicta that precedes the holding in which Jus-
tice Kennedy specifically remarks that Lawrence does not “involve
public conduct or prostitution.”2  However, Kennedy also wrote,
“as the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can in-
voke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”3  Both
a constant ambiguity and an explicitness run throughout the Law-
rence decision, opening discussions about rights to sexual autonomy
and providing an opportunity to reinvigorate and unify movements
of sexual liberation.  The ambiguity of Lawrence begs the question:
What are the boundaries of sexual freedom in the United States
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, and does it
create an argument for decriminalizing voluntary prostitution?4
This Article will address this question by discussing two pre-
dominant feminist theoretical perspectives on prostitution, gener-
ally described as “prostitution-as-work” and “prostitution-as-
violence.”  Next, the Article will review the majority and dissenting
* J.D., City University New York School of Law, May 2006; B.A. The New School
for Social Research, 1999. The author thanks Ruthann Robson for her continued
advice and mentorship.  The author also gratefully acknowledges her family and Jade
Townsend for their love and support.
1 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
2 Id. at 578.
3 Id. at 579.
4 This Article specifically deals with adult, female, heterosexual, voluntary prosti-
tution. This is not to invisibilize the experience of others working in prostitution, such
as queer and transgender prostitutes or the sex trafficking of women or girls. This
article aims to approach a stalled conversation about this specific type of prostitution,
which historically has been centralized in the debate, through the lens of the current
state of the law.  For reference on the topic of sex trafficking, see generally Mohamed
Y. Matter, Trafficking in Persons: An Annotated Legal Bibliography, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 669
(2004).  Little to no academic scholarship exists on the topics of gay, lesbian, or trans-
gender prostitution.
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opinions in Lawrence v. Texas and will describe People v. Williams,5 a
recent case from the Third District of Illinois Appellate Court, in
which a defendant unsuccessfully challenged her prostitution con-
viction as a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to engage in adult consensual sex as established in Lawrence.
Using Williams as a prototype, the Article will discuss why the defen-
dant in that case was not successful—and whether she ultimately
could be.  Lastly, the Article concludes that Lawrence represents a
step towards a legal recognition of the need to decriminalize pros-
titution and calls upon long-divided feminists to unite and con-
strue its inherent ambiguity towards liberating women in
prostitution.
II. BACKGROUND
Women working in prostitution are often an invisible or hated
class.  The criminalized business of prostitution lies on the fringes
of most of the communities where it exists and often in the poorest
and most forgotten neighborhoods.  It therefore exists away from
the public eye.6  Prostitution is nonetheless subject to public scru-
tiny when it finds itself in the spotlight, and then it is usually viewed
as stigmatized immoral behavior.7  Despite the long history of pros-
titution in the United States,8 the transaction of a woman ac-
cepting money for sex falls far outside the scope of perceived
legitimate female sexual behavior.9  The concept of decriminaliz-
ing prostitution therefore threatens to subvert the binary structures
on which dichotomies—such as active versus passive, public versus
private, and virgin versus whore—rely.  Within this structure, wo-
5 811 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
6 See Michelle S. Jacobs, Prostitutes, Drug Users, and Thieves: The Invisible Women in
the Campaign to End Violence Against Women, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 459, 469-
470 (1999); Carlin Meyer, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberation or Dehumanization?, 1
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 109-110 (1993).  For a discussion on how the feminist
dichotomy of public and private women relates to prostituted women, see Margaret A.
Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 47, 123-26 (1997).
7 For example in November 2005, a ballot measure in Berkeley that sought to
make prostitution the lowest priority for police evoked wide criticism as encouraging
prostitution-related crime in the area. See Ronald Weitzer, Why Prostitution Initiative
Misses, Measure Q in Berkley Fails on 3 Counts, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26, 2004, at E-3 (dis-
cussing that the measure ultimately failed by a 66% margin in what is typically a lib-
eral jurisdiction); Betty Yu, Prostitution Still a Crime in Berkeley, THE DAILY ONLINE
CALIFORNIAN, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.dailycal.org/particle.php?id=16782.
8 JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXU-
ALITY IN AMERICA 50-52 (2d ed., 1997).
9 See Susan E. Thompson, Prostitution—A Choice Ignored, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
217, 222-225 (2000); see generally KATHY PEISS & CHRISTINA SIMMONS, PASSION AND
POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY (1989).
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men who sell sex occupy the disempowered social status of prosti-
tutes, while men who seek sex with prostitutes remain temporal
actors separate from their fixed social status in society.  Prostitutes
disrupt deeply archaic notions of virginal femininity and sex as
purely monogamous, romantic, and procreative.
The criminal and social status of the prostitute has not com-
fortably found a niche in identity politics.  The changing politics of
the 1960’s gave rise to sexual liberation movements and second-
wave feminism.  Women began to examine the breadth of gender
oppression, gender inequality, and sex discrimination.  Sexual out-
laws mobilized for civil rights and sought to counter social stigma
and oppression.10  By the 1970s, many women’s rights advocates
argued against decriminalizing prostitution as a system that victim-
ized women11—a position that alienated many sex workers, often
low-income women of color, from what was a predominately white
middle-class movement.12  In 1973, Margo St. James organized a
group in California called WHO (Whores, Housewives, and
Others), which evolved into an international organization fighting
for prostitutes’ rights, now called COYOTE (Call Off Your Old
Tired Ethics).13  People on both sides of the debate understand
that working in prostitution leaves women vulnerable to violence
from police, pimps, and customers and without any health services,
legal protection, or recourse.  Prostitution-as-criminal conduct
therefore maintains subjugation of women who are already
marginalized by their usual status as poor, immigrant, or minority
women.14  It is this vulnerable position as a potential or constant
victim that still pulls the prostitute between two polarized feminist
10 See generally D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 300-43.
11 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 440 (1975) (arguing that “legalized
prostitution . . . institutionalizes the concept that it is man’s monetary right, if not his
divine right to gain access to the female body, and that sex is a female service that
should not be denied the civilized male”).
12 See Holly B. Fechner, Three Stories of Prostitution in the West: Prostitutes’ Groups, Law
and Feminist “Truth”, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 26, 34-37 (1994).
13 Margo St. James, Economic Justice for Sex Workers, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 5, 6
(1999).
14 There are three major approaches to how a government could handle prostitu-
tion: criminalization, decriminalization and legalization.  Criminalization represents
the system that most of the states have now, in which selling and buying sex is illegal
and prosecution of either carries criminal penalties.  Some feminists have argued that
maintaining criminalization of prostitution may be the best way to protect women in
prostitution. See, e.g., Margaret A. Baldwin, A Date with Justice: Prostitution and the
Decriminalization Debate, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 130 (1993) (arguing that
decriminalization will provide no protection for prostitutes, and “jailing victims of
sexual exploitation . . . [may] widen[ ] prostitutes’ margins of survival” because jail
offers a safe haven where women can detox, eat food, and even get HIV medication
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perspectives.  These two perspectives can be described as prostitute
as a victim of violent male supremacy, prostitute as worker, and
sometimes as empowered sexual agent.  However, current and for-
mer sex workers and other feminists from both perspectives be-
lieve, as a practical matter, that decriminalization is necessary to
liberate and protect women currently working as prostitutes.
A. Prostitution-as-Violence
Advocates who view prostitution as a violent exploitation of
women believe that prostitution is a literal expression of the vio-
lence of male dominance and misogyny that all other women expe-
rience metaphorically.  Male supremacy subjugates all women, and
prostitution is an explicit illustration of living under male
supremacy.  Under this theory, prostitution exists because of a se-
ries of variables in women’s lives, such as incest, drug addiction,
poverty, racism, and homelessness.15  The only constant in the
prostitution equation is a society of gender inequality in which a
woman’s only true possession is her body, which she allows in
desperation to be exploited for the satisfaction of men.16  This po-
sition presumes that prostitution may be entered into voluntarily,
that is not readily available to them out of jail); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 11
and accompanying text.
Decriminalization is the removal of laws and regulation, equating prostitution to
other legal occupations.  Decriminalization of prostitution takes many forms. Swe-
den, for example, decriminalizes the sale of prostitution but maintains criminal pen-
alties for the purchase of sex.  Maria Grahn-Farley, The Law Room: Hyperrealist
Jurisprudence and Postmodern Politics, 36 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 29, 39-40 (2001). This is a
model that many feminists advocate. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF
SEXUALITY 298 (1995). However, others advocate for full decriminalization for both
sellers and buyers of sex. E.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 217 (arguing that “prostitu-
tion can be a tool of empowerment that will allow those women who choose it as a
career to exercise personal power, economic freedom and sexual autonomy,” and, to
attain that goal, “prostitution must be totally decriminalized . . . [to erase] the social
stigma associated with prostitution”).
Lastly, legalization requires direct regulation by the state, which may include zon-
ing requirements and mandatory tests for sexually transmitted diseases.  A model of
legalized and heavily regulated prostitution exists in certain Nevada counties.  This
approach has been widely criticized as imposing the state as another form of pimp on
the prostitute.  Nicole Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 69, 70, 84-90 (1998) (analyzing the legalized prostitution system in Ne-
vada and arguing that it is “not a good model for changing the current situation of
prostitution”).
15  See April L. Cherry, Welfare Reform and the Use of State Power in the Prostitution of
Poor Women, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 72-75 (2000); Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe,
Duet: Prostitution, Racism and Feminist Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 40-45
(1999); Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 67-68 (1993).
16  E.g., Andrea Dworkin, Prostitution and Male Supremacy, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1
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but is never a free choice.  That is to say, all women want to leave
prostitution but are unable to because of the system of male domi-
nance that preserves the factors that lead women to prostitution in
the first place: rape, abuse, female poverty, and incest.  Prostitution
is therefore often characterized as sexual slavery, in which prosti-
tutes are not agents.  At best, they are virtually nonexistent in a
phallo-centric society that uses prostitutes to express hatred of the
female body,17 or at worst they are gender “Uncle Toms” who per-
petuate patriarchal values.18
Proponents of this position argue that the inherent violence
suffered by women in prostitution at the hand of male dominance
is a truth silenced by the system itself and obscured by feminists
arguing for complete decriminalization of prostitution.  Andrea
Dworkin, feminist author and scholar, argues that the prostitute’s
experience “has been hidden [because] . . . to know it is to come
closer to knowing how to undo the system of male dominance that
is sitting on top of all of us.”19  Others also argue that, although the
realities of women in prostitution have been hidden, prostitution is
not a private act that the law should protect, but rather is an act of
sexual abuse that the state should not sanction.20
Most of the authors cited herein are united with organizations
such as Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), Women
Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt (WHISPER),
and others that argue that women should never be punished for
being exploited.  These authors support the decriminalization of
the sale of sex, with an ultimate goal of abolishing prostitution by
empowering and enabling those women in it to leave.  They also
generally advocate maintaining statutes criminalizing the acts of
buyers, pimps, and brothels and other sex establishments, while
creating systems to allow women to completely escape
prostitution.21
(1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
13 (1993).
17 See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979); MacKinnon, supra
note 16.
18 Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution?, 99 ETHICS 347, 357 (1989).
19 Dworkin, supra note 16, at 5.
20 BROWNMILLER, supra note 11; Janice G. Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing
Prostitution and a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution, in PROSTITUTION, TRAF-
FICKING AND TRAUMATIC STRESS 315 (Melissa Farley ed., 2003) available at http://ac-
tion.web.ca/home/catw/readingroom.shtml?x=32972.
21 E.g., BARRY, supra note 14 and accompanying text; Raymond, supra note 20.  “In
countries where women are criminalized for prostitution activities, it is crucial to ad-
vocate for the decriminalization of the women in prostitution. No woman should be
punished for her own exploitation. But States should never decriminalize pimps, buy-
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B. Prostitution-as-Work
Supporters of the prostitution-as-work perspective agree that
the criminal justice system as it currently applies to prostitutes is
governed by misogyny and sex discrimination.  However, they fun-
damentally disagree with the prostitution-as-exploitation theory in
several ways.  First, they believe that women can and do choose to
perform sex work.22  Central to this perspective is the description
of prostitution as work, not as a violent exploitation of women.23
They demand that a woman’s choice to enter sex work be
respected and afforded the same legal protection as any other ser-
vice industry job.24  Further, the removal of the social stigma
around sex work is necessary to achieve workers’ rights protections
and economic equality.25
Prostitution-as-work theorists focus on the choice to enter sex
work, and believe that most prostitutes do, in fact, choose that
work.26  They argue that because street prostitution is the most visi-
ble—as opposed to women working in businesses such as massage
parlors, brothels, and escort services—it is therefore the most dom-
inant stereotypical image of prostitution in the American social
consciousness.  However, according to recent figures, only 10% to
20% of prostitutes work on the street.27  Further, at 40%, women of
color represent a disproportionate percentage of street prosti-
tutes.28  Some prostitution-as-work theorists have reasoned that be-
cause “women of color are more likely to be socio-economically
disadvantaged than their white counterparts . . . [they] therefore
turn to street prostitution for immediate economic relief.”29  They
ers, procurers, brothels or other sex establishments.” Id. “Treating prostitution as a
civil rights violation transforms the buying of sex from a transgressive act that rein-
forces the dichotomy [of degeneracy and respectability] to a discriminatory act that
undermines it.”  Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1220, 1296-97 (1999).
22 E.g., Thompson, supra note 9; St. James, supra note 13.
23 See Amalia Lucia Cabezas, Legal Challenges To and By Sex Workers/Prostitutes, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79, 79-83 (2000) (discussing the development of the term “sex
worker”).
24 See Fechner, supra note 12, at 38.
25 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 217-18.
26 VALERIE JENNESS, MAKING IT WORK: THE PROSTITUTES’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN PER-
SPECTIVE 67-71 (1993).
27 Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRIT-
INGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184, 189 (Fre´de´rique Delacoste & Priscilla Alex-
ander eds., 1987).
28 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 261
(1989).
29 Thompson, supra note 9, at 226.
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also recognize that some women do not choose sex work and do
want to leave it, but they argue that decriminalizing prostitution
would help lift this small percentage of women out from under the
oppression of the criminal justice system.30
Because the emphasis is on workers’ rights, these theorists de-
mand the same protections and benefits available to other legiti-
mate professions, such as the right to organize around issues of
health benefits and work conditions.31  Decriminalization would al-
low prostitutes to form stronger support networks, unionize,32 ac-
cess private health insurance,33 and access public benefits such as
social security, disability insurance, and worker’s compensation.34
They also disagree with those who promote the continued pro-
hibition and increased prosecution of buyers of sex because this
would dry up the income source needed for prostitutes’ economic
advancement and deny prostitutes the full rights to their work.
Further, it undercuts the contention that sex work should not be
shameful and women performing it should not experience further
marginalization.35  Margo St. James has argued that as long as pros-
titution abolitionists “work to . . . promote prohibition, they abdi-
cate the right to later complain that any sexual liberties, including
abortion and a women’s right to control her own body, are also
being restricted.”36  Others argue that prostitution is a sexually lib-
erating and empowering choice because it allows women to re-
claim their sexuality37 and subverts historical fear and repression of
female sexuality.38
While fundamental perspectives and ultimate goals differ
under these two umbrella concepts, generally there exists a pas-
sionate common goal of liberating women in prostitution.  They
overwhelmingly agree that decriminalization is the necessary tool
towards that goal.  A goal of decriminalization can therefore be
seen as a first step, requiring otherwise divided activists and schol-
30 See, e.g., Belinda Cooper, Prostitution: A Feminist Analysis, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 99, 100 (1989).
31 See Alexander, supra note 27, at 210.
32 Fechner, supra note 12, at 38.
33 Tracy M. Clements, Prostitution and the American Health Care System: Denying Access
To a Group of Women in Need, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 54 (1996).
34 See id. at 87-89.
35 See generally Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The Criminalization of
Prostitution, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 47; see also Fechner, supra note 12, at 72.
36 St. James, supra note 13, at 6-7.
37 See Veronica Mone´t, Sedition, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS, 221 (Jill Nagle
ed., 1997).
38 See Jill Nagle, First Ladies of Feminist Porn: A Conversation with Candida Royalle and
Debi Sundahm, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS, supra note 37, at 161.
168 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:161
ars to unite in taking that first step. Lawrence v. Texas may re-
present the vehicle through which unity can initially occur.  The
next section discusses the Lawrence majority and dissenting opin-
ions and People v. Williams, a case that attempted to apply Lawrence
in challenging Illinois’s prostitution statute.
III. LAWRENCE AND WILLIAMS
A. Lawrence Majority: The Explicitness and Ambiguity of Sexual
Freedom
Lawrence v. Texas overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,39 decided sixteen years earlier, which upheld a
Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy.40  In doing so, the ma-
jority in Lawrence dissected the Court’s decision in Bowers, but it fell
short of declaring the right to consensual adult sex a fundamental
right—or even clearly establishing it as a constitutionally protected
right.41
The Lawrence Court rejected the description of the liberty
right at issue in Bowers, which was stated as “a fundamental right
[of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”42  The Lawrence Court de-
scribed this articulation of the liberty interest as demeaning, and it
reframed the issue more broadly as “whether the petitioners were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.”43
The Lawrence majority approached this analysis indirectly by
rebutting each prong of the Bowers Court’s fundamental rights
analysis.  After confronting the “deeply rooted” prong of the analy-
39 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
40 539 U.S. at 578
41 Id.  When a petitioner asserts a substantive due process challenge, the court
applies the following analysis to determine whether the liberty right can be classified
as a fundamental right.  First, the court analyzes the careful description of the liberty
at stake.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  Next the court applies
a two-prong analysis: First, whether the asserted right deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and tradition; and, second, whether it is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty such that, if sacrificed, neither liberty nor justice would exist. Id.  If the court
finds that the right satisfies this test, it applies strict scrutiny to the challenged law. Id.
To find a law constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis, the state must show that
the statute is “narrowly tailored” to a compelling government interest. Id.  If the court
does not find that the right satisfies this test, the court may analyze the statute under
the most deferential review, rational basis, which requires that a legitimate state inter-
est be rationally related to the means chosen to achieve the objective of the statute.
Id.
42 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
43 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
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sis and finding that sodomy laws were historically not aimed at con-
sensual homosexual partners, the majority recognized that the
broader point in Bowers was a recognition that homosexuality had
long been condemned as immoral.44  However, the Lawrence Court
stated that the majority’s moral code could not dictate the criminal
code.45
The Court also approached the second prong of the funda-
mental rights analysis indirectly by addressing an “emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.”46  To support the finding of an emerging awareness and a
subsequent erosion of much of the foundation of Bowers’s ordered
liberty analysis, the Court listed a series of international and do-
mestic instances where sodomy laws had been ignored or repealed
at the time that Bowers was decided.47  Then the Lawrence Court
noted two post-Bowers decisions that would have weakened its analy-
sis had they been decided at that time.  First, citing Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided six years af-
ter Bowers, the Lawrence majority found that the rights to seek au-
tonomy and self-determination are fundamental and must be
shared equally by homosexual and heterosexual people.48  Second,
the court cited Romer v. Evans49 for the proposition that laws may
not discriminate against homosexuals as a class and that animosity
towards homosexual people cannot be a legitimate state interest.50
The underlying assumption in Lawrence is that the protections
articulated in Casey and Romer—self-autonomy and freedom from
state-sponsored animus, respectively—extend to homosexual peo-
ple in proper traditional relationships.  In his reframing of the is-
44 Id. at 567-571 (finding “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers . . . more
complex than the majority opinion . . . indicate[s],” and acknowledging that “the
Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral”).
45 Id. at 571 (recognizing that “the condemnation [of homosexual conduct as im-
moral] have been shaped by religious beliefs,” but arguing that “the issue is whether
the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law.”  The Court argues “our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not mandate our own moral code.”) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
46 Id. at 572.
47 Id. at 572 (noting that several states have adopted the American Law Institute’s
Model Penal code opposing “criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations con-
ducted in private”).
48 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
49 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
50 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
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sue in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the con-
duct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more en-
during.”51  In applying the liberty at stake in Casey to Lawrence,
Kennedy quoted the following passage from the former:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these mat-
ters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.52
This passage forcefully argues for broad freedoms, but it is inter-
preted narrowly as applied to homosexual sex, reducing the scope
from the rights of all individuals to individuals in same-sex relation-
ships.  Kennedy writes, “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual per-
sons do.”53  Here, the language is explicitly limited from the rights
of “heterosexual persons” to the rights of “persons in a homosex-
ual relationship.”54  The argument for bodily integrity then disap-
pears and the privacy issue focuses on the rights of homosexual
people in traditionally recognized relationships—and then only in
their bedrooms.55
Importantly, before the Court explicitly overruled Bowers and
51 Id. at 567.
52 Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
53 Id.
54 For an in-depth discussion of how Lawrence has domesticated the issue of gay
and lesbian rights, see Katherine Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004), which argues that “in Lawrence the Court relies
on a narrow version of liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a
robust conception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is commonly assumed.  In this way,
Lawrence both echoes and reinforces a pull toward domesticity in current gay and
lesbian organizing.” Conversely, David M. Wager argues that the privacy case lines
discussed in Lawrence “protect a zone of bourgeois, law-abiding normality, not a zone
of personal self-definition,” and that “[t]he later cases, beginning with Griswold v. Con-
necticut, protect a right of personal decision-making with regard to one issue, namely,
whether to become parents.” David M. Wager, Hints, not Holdings: Use of Precedent in
Lawrence v. Texas, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 681, 682 (2004).
55 Lawrence pulls presumably male monogamous homosexual sex closer towards
the center of Gayle Rubin’s “charmed circle,” which diagrams sexual hierarchies with
good sex, deemed to be “sanctifiable, safe, healthy, mature, legal or politically cor-
rect” at the center, and “bad, abnormal, unnatural, [and] damned sexuality” at the
outer limits.  Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex, Note for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexual-
ity, in SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 551, 555 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D.
Hunter eds., 2004).
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invalidated the Texas statute as unconstitutional, the majority
listed a series of circumstances not at issue in Lawrence.  These in-
clude sex between minors, coerced sex, prostitution, and gay mar-
riage or civil unions.56  Finally, the Court states, “[t]heir right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives [the petitioners] the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.”57  However, in finding the statute unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court surprisingly invokes the language of rational
basis review, stating that the statute furthered no legitimate interest
that can justify the intrusion into a person’s privacy.58
The consistent overt language throughout Lawrence of liberty,
autonomy, and privacy rights, coupled with the reiteration by the
Court that morality cannot dictate law, contradict the Court’s one-
sentence failure to expressly declare adult consensual sex a funda-
mental right.  Assuming that this is no linguistic accident, the fail-
ure of declaring a fundamental right gives the impression that the
Court intended to infer the possibility that a constitutionally pro-
tected fundamental right to sexual privacy could exist, but they
were not prepared to state that now.59   The Court could have eas-
ily said that the Texas statute does not even pass rational basis re-
view and therefore strict scrutiny need not be applied.60  The
noticeable absence of a declaration of a fundamental right to sex-
ual privacy betrays the mounting expectation of such a formal ac-
knowledgement.  This void creates a tension and ambiguity in
Lawrence that opens the possibility of both progressive goals of sex-
ual liberation and self-determination and of conservative regres-
sion, including a possible expansion of the states’ ability to regulate
sex.
B. Scalia’s Dissent: Fear of Revolution and Hope for Regression
This notion of ambiguity fuels conservative and liberal goals
alike, and appears to have informed the themes of fear and hope
in Justice Scalia’s dissent.  Ironically, the dissent begins with the
following quote from Casey: “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurispru-
56 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
60 The Massachusetts Supreme Court employed similar language in invalidating a
marriage statute that prohibited same-sex marriage.  The court held, “because the
statute does not survive rational basis review, [the court need] not consider the plain-
tiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.”  Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
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dence of doubt.”61  Scalia states that the quote intends to reveal the
Court’s hypocrisy in its refusal to overrule Roe in Casey on the
grounds of stare decisis doctrine, in contrast to the Court’s willing-
ness to overrule Bowers in Lawrence.62  However, this quote also con-
veys another meaning.  It implies that the majority cowered from
the opportunity to declare adult consensual sex a fundamental
right.  Scalia discusses the Court’s failure to formally overrule the
holding in Bowers that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental
right.  He criticizes the Court’s failure to apply a strict fundamental
rights analysis and overrule Bowers on those grounds.  The allusion
to the majority’s ambivalence sets the stage for this continually im-
plied accusation throughout the opinion63 and for the future pos-
sibilities it presents.
Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, joined by Justice Thomas and for-
mer Chief Justice Rehnquist, concludes that the right to homosex-
ual sodomy is not fundamental and therefore the Texas statute is
valid under a rational basis review—it does not deny homosexual
defendants equal protection.64  The dissent serves three purposes
and speaks to Lawrence’s ambivalence on these themes: (1) A
roadmap to overturning Roe v. Wade65 following the Lawrence deci-
sion;66 (2) a warning against the possible strategies towards al-
lowing same-sex marriage following the Lawrence decision;67 and
(3) a general caution against a sexual revolution devoid of morality
following Lawrence.68
Justice Scalia’s caution against a “massive disruption of the
current social order” runs throughout the dissenting opinion.69
This suggests that the underlying rationale of the minority opinion
is that the structure of American culture hinges on the need for
restraints on sexual freedom and that without such laws there ex-
ists the potential for social chaos.70  Aside from the strong focus on
the possibility that the majority’s opinion in Lawrence sets up an
61 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
62 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 594.
64 Id. at 605.
65 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding the right to an abortion a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
66 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-592.
67 Id. at 603-605.
68 Id. at 591.
69 Id. at 591.
70 See Daniel Gordon, Moralism, the Fear of Social Chaos: The Dissent in Lawrence and
the Antidotes of Vermont and Brown, 9 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 10-17 (2003) (discussing
Scalia’s implicit view of homosexuals as threats to American society, and arguing that
Scalia’s vision of homosexuality as a societal threat possesses no basis in social fact).
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argument for finding same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional,
Scalia consistently refers to the possibility of the end of all laws in
which the state regulates the body.  Three times he argues that
prohibitions on prostitution can now be found invalid under Law-
rence based on the majority’s holding that sexual morality cannot
be a legitimate state interest.71
The dissent summarizes an interpretation of the majority
opinion as a three-step justification for overruling precedent: first,
whether subsequent decisions have eroded its foundation; second,
whether the decision has been subject to criticism; and third,
whether individuals or society as a whole have not relied on the
decision.72  In describing the third prong of reliance, the dissent
rebuts the majority’s finding of no societal reliance on Bowers by
listing a series of judicial decisions that did rely on Bowers as prece-
dent.  Further, Scalia notes that the Lawrence decision calls into
question the constitutionality of prostitution laws because of the
impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality laws from other mo-
rality laws.73
Next, in moving past the Court’s stare decisis analysis, Scalia
argues that Bowers was not wrongly decided.  He does so by criticiz-
ing the Court’s failure to strictly apply the substantive due process
and fundamental rights analysis described in Glucksberg.  He begins
71 It is true that following the Lawrence decision, a flurry of law review articles were
published about the scope of its holding.  Although many focus on applying Lawrence
to a hopeful future of social change, many others argued that in fact Lawrence im-
posed further restraints on progressive causes, such as reproductive freedom and
transgender rights towards self-determination. See, e.g., Cynthia Dailard, What Law-
rence v. Texas Says About the History and Future of Reproductive Rights, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 717 (2004) (arguing that the retirement of one of the Justices “who support[ed] a
woman’s right to choose would provide the anti-choice Bush administration with the
opportunity it is seeking to appoint a like-minded Justice, making the scenario that
Justice Scalia predicted [in Lawrence]—namely, Roe’s demise—more likely than ever
before”); see also Paisley Currah, The Other “Sex” in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 321-322 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence reaffirmed the “legal regime
in which transgender people are denied equality before the law”).  More conservative
scholars came to similar conclusions. For example, Joseph Bozzuti’s article, The Con-
stitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a
Prophet?, undertakes a project similar to my own, analyzing whether Lawrence repeals
polygamy bans.  Bozzuti ultimately decides that the Lawrence decision “may very well
have left all morals-based legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack,” but that both
prostitution and polygamy bans are safe because of their wider use of protecting the
safety of women and children. Joseph Bozzuti, 43 CATH. LAW. 409, 413, 433-441
(2004).
72 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 590 (noting that “State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult in-
cest, [and] prostitution . . . are [ ] sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws
based on moral choices.”) (emphasis added).
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by stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a
right to liberty—it only provides that the states may not deprive
citizens of liberty without due process of law.  In an interesting illus-
tration of this point, Scalia states that prohibitions on prostitution
and recreational heroin use both deprive citizens of liberty.74
Scalia attacks the majority’s use of “an emerging awareness that lib-
erty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”75  He ar-
gues that the statement does not satisfy a historical or fundamental
rights analysis and is inherently false because states continue to
prosecute adults for the consensual private adult sexual conduct of
prostitution.76
In 2004, one woman based her appeal of a four-year sentence
on a prostitution charge on the premise that Lawrence v. Texas
opens the possibility to decriminalizing prostitution.
C. People v. Williams: Challenging Prostitution Post-Lawrence
In November 2001, while walking the street, Donna Williams
accepted an invitation into a car by a man who turned out to be an
undercover police officer.77  Williams and the man agreed that she
would perform oral sex for $30.78  She was then arrested, charged,
and convicted of prostitution.79
The Illinois criminal code defines prostitution as:
Any person who performs, offers or agrees to perform any act of
sexual penetration . . . for any money, property, token, object,
or article or anything of value, or any touching or fondling of
the sex organs of one person by another person, for any money,
property, token, object, or article or anything of value for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification commits an act of
prostitution.80
A first-time prostitution charge is classified as a “Class A” misde-
meanor81 and carries a prison sentence of less than one year.82
Any subsequent charges elevate the conduct to a “Class 4” felony,83
74 Id. at 592 (noting that the Texas statute “undoubtedly imposes constraints on
liberty. So do laws prohibiting prostitution [and] recreational use of heroin . . . .”).
75 Id. at 597 (citing majority opinion at 572) (internal citations omitted).
76 Id. at 598.
77 Williams, 811 N.E.2d at 1198.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14(a) (West 2002).
81 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14(b) (West 2002).
82 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-3(a)(1) (West 2004).
83 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14(b) (West 2002).
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which, under Illinois law, carries a sentence of between one and
three years.84  Williams had prior prostitution convictions and
therefore was subject to sentencing under the “Class 4” felony reg-
ulations; Williams was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.85  It
is not clear from the court’s opinion why she received a penalty
that exceeds the maximum by one year.  It appears, however, that
she did not challenge this sentence as an abuse of discretion, the
standard by which Illinois reviews sentencing challenges.86
On appeal, Williams conceded that her conduct violated Illi-
nois state law, but she argued that after Lawrence v. Texas prostitu-
tion, as private sexual conduct between two consenting adults, is
constitutionally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.87  Delivering the opinion for the court, Judge
Mary K. O’Brien narrowed the description of the constitutionally
protected activity in Lawrence as the “consensual act of sodomy in
the privacy of [the] home.”88  She rejected Williams’s argument
that the statute prohibits constitutionally protected conduct by
classifying the conduct not as private consensual sex but commer-
cial sex.  The court also turned to the legislative intent of the stat-
ute, noting that the drafters clearly distinguished their aim of
prohibiting commercial sex from intruding upon private non-com-
mercial acts.89
O’Brien analyzed the due process challenge under rational re-
view and ultimately found the law constitutional, thereby affirming
the lower court’s holding.90  The Johnson court cited a 1978 case
from the Appellate Court of Illinois, People v. Johnson, where a wo-
man similarly challenged the Illinois prostitution statute as an in-
fringement on her constitutionally protected right of privacy.91
The court articulated the state’s interests as “preventing venereal
disease, cutting down prostitution-related crimes of violence and
theft, and protecting the integrity and stability of family life.”92
Here, the court adopted the rationale in Johnson and found that
the statute was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest of
84 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 2004).
85 Williams, 811 N.E.2d at 1197.
86 People v. Stacey, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ill. 2000).
87 Williams, 811 N.E.2d at 1199.
88 Id. at 1199.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See People v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).  In this case, the
defendant Althea Johnson was convicted of prostitution after she offered oral sex to
an undercover police officer for $50.
92 Williams, 811 N.E.2d at 1198 (quoting Johnson, 376 N.E.2d at 386).
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protecting public welfare. Therefore, the statute did not violate
Williams’s constitutional rights.93  The court further rejected Wil-
liams’s reliance on Lawrence by citing that the caveat paragraph of
Lawrence “specifically excluded from its opinion . . . acts of
prostitution.”94
Below this Article discusses whether Lawrence could be inter-
preted as overturning prostitution laws.  This first requires a brief
discussion on how the lower courts have interpreted and applied
Lawrence.
IV. LAWRENCE AND PROSTITUTION
A. Post-Lawrence
In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the Lawrence Court explicitly
stated that the fundamental right at stake was incorrectly defined
as the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy.95  Justice Ken-
nedy reframed the issue before the court as “whether the petition-
ers’ criminal conviction for adult consensual intimacy in the home
violates their vital interest in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and held that
it did.96  Despite this explicit language, several state courts have
sought to narrow Lawrence by citing the following four sentences of
dicta as the Court’s holding:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused.  It does
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.97
Courts have used this passage to refute parties’ attempts to apply
Lawrence as precedent to their own cases.  It has been used to sup-
port decisions denying homosexuals the right to adopt children;98
denying an extension of Lawrence’s protection against criminal con-
viction for private sexual acts, including sodomy, to minors;99 deny-
93 Id. at 1198-1199.
94 Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).
95 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
96 Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 578.
98 See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Lawrence by stating that the majority limited its holding to
its facts, and finding that Lawrence does not apply because adoption involves minors
and does not exist within the criminal context).
99 See State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
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ing an extension of the same right in the military context;100
denying a recognition by the United States of same-sex marriages
formed in Canada;101 and denying a recognition of same-sex mar-
riage in the United States.102  All of these cases expressed a reti-
cence to extend the holding in Lawrence beyond its factual scenario
and to declare a constitutionally protected right to sexual privacy.
In addition to disregarding much of the language and the
spirit of Lawrence and interpreting a sentence of dicta as the hold-
ing, these cases have used the inherent ambivalence in Lawrence
toward restrictive ends.  A case from the Eleventh Circuit, Williams
v. Attorney General of Alabama, serves as another example.103   In this
case, the American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of sellers and
buyers of sex toys, challenged an Alabama statute prohibiting com-
mercial distribution of any device primarily used for sexual stimula-
tion.  The court held that there is no fundamental, substantive due
process right of consenting adults to engage in private, intimate
sexual conduct.104  Like the cases mentioned above, the court rea-
soned that because the Supreme Court failed to apply strict scru-
tiny in Lawrence, it also failed to establish a substantive due process
right to sexual privacy.105  It remains to be seen if other lower
courts will interpret this ambivalence more expansively as establish-
ing a constitutionally protected right of consenting adults to en-
gage in private sexual intimacy, which—despite its holding
applying a heightened rational basis review—is the spirit of the
decision.
B. Prostitution as Constitutionally Protected Sex
Lower courts’ interpretations of Lawrence have thus far been
disheartening.  Though Scalia criticizes the majority for turning
Casey’s “sweet-mystery-of-life” passage into “the passage that ate the
rule of law,”106 Lawrence’s caveat paragraph has swallowed its hold-
100 Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208 (distinguishing Lawrence by finding that sex with a
subordinate service member within one’s chain of command is a context in which
“consent might not easily be refused” (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)).
101 See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 139 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (stating that Law-
rence did “not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578).
102 See Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 487-88 n.32 (Cal.
2004).
103 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the passage calls into ques-
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ing and spirit.  The paragraph is classic dictum but is yet to be seen
as such.  The Supreme Court in Lawrence set forth a heightened
level of review when it characterized the right to sexual privacy as
very important and evoked a combination of rational basis and fun-
damental rights analyses.  The Court explained, “the State cannot
demean [people’s] existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime.”107  This suggests that in ap-
plying Lawrence as precedent for the protection of sexual privacy,
the outcome might turn on the state’s interests.  However, subse-
quent decisions thus far imply that the escape hatch is too tempt-
ing for judges to even apply the heightened level of scrutiny
conveyed in Lawrence when a party asserts his or her right to sexual
privacy.  Instead, any state interest will suffice.
The Williams court, for example, failed to analyze the defen-
dant’s constitutional challenge under the heightened level of re-
view.  When she evoked her constitutionally protected right to
sexual freedom, the court should have more closely scrutinized
whether the statute was rationally related to the state’s interests.
The state’s interests included “preventing venereal disease, cutting
down prostitution-related crimes of violence and theft, and protect-
ing the integrity and stability of family life.”108  Without a more
searching review, these interests were quickly found rationally re-
lated to the statute.
The articulated interests described in Williams support the no-
tion that prostitution statutes exemplify male supremacy and mis-
ogyny.  Although state goals are veiled in the language of
protection of the public welfare, they are in fact rooted in animus
against sex workers.  A closer look at these state interests demon-
strates that private conduct is being regulated for the unconstitu-
tional purpose of animus.  Many strong arguments for the lack of
rationality of prostitution statutes, as discussed earlier, are ignored.
For example, condoms protect from venereal disease more effec-
tively than a jail cell.  Therefore, it seems that the stated goal of
preventing venereal disease translates to the protection of men
from contracting venereal diseases from prostitutes.  Otherwise,
the state would also take measures to protect the prostitute from
the diseased customer who initially infected her.109  Next, the argu-
tion the government’s power to regulate actions based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of
existence, etc.,’ it is the passage that ate the rule of law.”).
107 Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
108 Williams, 811 N.E.2d at 1198.
109 But see Thompson, supra note 9, at 229 (noting that “studies have indicated that
only 5% of sexually transmitted diseases were related to prostitution”).
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ment of cutting down on prostitution-related crime is ultimately
one of the goals that feminists expect decriminalization to achieve.
In decriminalization, prostitutes would have a legal recourse for
crimes committed against them such as rape, theft, and violence;
thus having a retributive and deterrent effect.
Lastly, the court’s affirmation of the state interest in protect-
ing the integrity and stability of family life further demonstrates its
misogynist logic.  It suggests a concern that removing the criminal
consequences of soliciting a prostitute would more easily tempt
men into infidelity.  The court’s reasoning that jailing sex workers
will protect families requires these women to bear a burden not
equally shared with their married customers. The argument that
jailing a prostitute is justified to protect against a man’s unfaithful-
ness to his wife explicitly lays the blame on prostitutes for the
problems in America’s marriages   Even if it is true—that the exis-
tence of prostitution leads to infidelity—this concern is clearly a
private matter and not an issue of public welfare, further demon-
strating the underlying animus.  Had the Williams court done a
more searching analysis of the state’s articulated interests, the ani-
mus prohibited by the Supreme Court may not have been as easily
resolved.110
The Williams court’s focus on the concerns of buyers of sex
and their wives fails to examine the effect of criminal sanctions for
the seller of sex.  In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice
O’Connor spoke to the significance of these secondary conse-
quences, including the requirement of registering as a sex of-
fender, the exclusion from various professions, and the stigma of
being branded a criminal.111 Lawrence holds that “the State cannot
demean [people’s] existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime.”112  The same could be true
for the private sexual conduct of buyers and sellers of sex.  Until
attention focuses on the immediate need for decriminalization, the
hope that courts will apply Lawrence as protecting a right to com-
mercial sex is unrealistic.
V. CONCLUSION
The promise of Lawrence lies in its introduction of an evolving
norm.  To apply this doctrine—which recognizes an “emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
110 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
111 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
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in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex,”113—towards a goal of liberation from sexual(ity) and gen-
der oppression requires a unified social movement to develop such
an awareness.  The reasoning in Williams derived from the 1978
case People v. Johnson, and the social conception of prostitution re-
mains frozen in that time.  Therefore, the Williams court may not
have been wrong in applying Johnson as binding authority even af-
ter Lawrence.
Just as the Lawrence majority looked to the repeal of sodomy
laws by the European courts, the approach of foreign countries
that have legalized or decriminalized prostitution could serve as
examples of whether the fears of state legislatures are justified.114
However, on a local level, there is little happening in Illinois to
support the argument that there exists an emerging awareness of
the need for decriminalization.  Only small traces of the feminist
movement’s goal of liberating women in prostitution are evident in
Illinois.  For example, a recent study out of Chicago by the Center
of Impact criticizes the disparate impact prostitution laws have on
African-American women.115  In 2004, a bill supported by Republi-
can and Democrat senators passed in Illinois allowing prostitution
charges to be sealed from public record.  This aimed to encourage
people convicted of prostitution to apply for jobs, thereby reducing
the recidivism rate.116
A recent ballot measure in Berkeley, California, which sought
to decrease the police priority of prostitution, may serve as an ex-
ample of how the feminist divide can stall any real social movement
on this issue.117  The feminist debate was again highlighted with
some arguing that decriminalization is a goal championed by
white-middle class academics far removed from the realities of
street prostitutes and others arguing that prostitution laws are the
product of paternalistic notions of female sexuality.118
Even with this counter-productive divide, a majority of current
113 Id. at 572.
114 See Grahn-Farley, supra note 14.
115 For a discussion on this topic, also see Vednita Nelson, Prostitution: Where Racism
and Sexism Intersect, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 81 (1993).
116 Cal Skinner, Bill Moving to Seal Criminal Records for “Victimless Crimes,” Ill. LEADER,
Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.mpp.org/IL/news_7190.html.
117 Kai Ma, U.S. Prostitutes Split Over Prostitution Measure, North Gate News Online,
Nov. 1, 2004, http://journalism.berkeley.edu/ngno/stories/003577.html.
118 Id. (citing Janice Raymond saying that “[t]here are two groups of women in the
prostitution debate. The first group is characterized as being articulate, and engaging
in outlaw sexuality or sexuality as a form of resistance. The second group is out on the
streets, in brothels, trafficked, poor, and of mainly African, Latin or Asian descent.”).
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and former prostitutes and other feminists agree that decriminal-
ization is a step towards guaranteeing prostitutes’ civil rights and
promoting safety and equality for women.119  This requires that wo-
men’s rights activists unite and create a social movement that
would awaken the social conception of the injustice of prostitution
statutes.  The prostitutes’ rights movement is fairly stagnant com-
pared to the gay rights movement’s success in removing the social
stigma of homosexuality and the repeal of sodomy laws.120  This
may be attributed in part to the degree of in-fighting amongst the
very people who advocate for decriminalization.  The lack of unity
stalls any social and political movement and awareness that would
perhaps compel courts to follow the emerging awareness standard
set forth in Lawrence, fulfilling the promise for liberation embed-
ded within its language.
119 See supra Part II.
120 See generally D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 9.

